Abstract-We consider a game-theoretic model where individuals compete over a shared failure-prone system or resource. We investigate the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in controlling the utilization of the resource at the Nash equilibrium when the decision-makers have behavioral risk preferences, captured by prospect theory. We first observe that heterogeneous prospect-theoretic risk preferences can lead to counter-intuitive outcomes. In particular, for resources that exhibit network effects, utilization can increase under taxation and there may not exist a tax rate that achieves the socially optimal level of utilization. We identify conditions under which utilization is monotone and continuous, and then characterize the range of utilizations that can be achieved by a suitable choice of tax rate. We further show that resource utilization is higher when players are charged differentiated tax rates compared to the case when all players are charged an identical tax rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale cyber-physical systems form the basis of much of society's critical infrastructure [2] , and thus must be designed to be resilient to failures and attacks in order to avoid catastrophic social and economic consequences. While there are a variety of angles to designing such systems to be more resilient (including the design of secure control schemes [3] , [4] , interconnection topologies [5] , [6] , and resilient communication mechanisms [7] ), there is an increasing realization that the resilience of these systems also depends crucially on the humans that use them [8] , [9] . Therefore, in order to design more resilient socio-cyber-physical systems, it is critical to understand (in a rigorous mathematical framework) the decisions made by humans in decentralized and uncertain environments, and to influence those decisions to obtain better outcomes for the entire system [9] - [11] .
In this paper, we investigate the impacts of human decisionmaking on the resiliency of a shared system in a gametheoretic framework. Game theory has emerged as a natural framework to investigate the impacts of decentralized decisionmaking on the efficiency, security and robustness of large-scale systems [9] , [12] . When the utilities of the decision-makers or players are uncertain (e.g., due to risk of system failure or cyber-attack), their risk preferences play a significant role in shaping their behavior. With the exception of a few recent papers, most of the existing theoretical literature involving uncertainty in game-theoretic settings models decision-makers as This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation, under grant CNS-1718637. A preliminary version of this work appeared in the proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2016 [1] .
Ashish R. Hota is with the Automatic Control Laboratory, ETH Zürich. Shreyas Sundaram is with the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Purdue University, USA. (e-mail: ahota@control.ee.ethz.ch, sundara2@purdue.edu) risk neutral (expectation maximizers) or risk averse (expected utility maximizers with respect to a concave utility function). However, empirical evidence has shown that the preferences of human decision-makers systematically deviate from the preferences of a risk neutral or risk averse decision-maker [13] , [14] . Specifically, humans compare different outcomes with a reference utility level, and exhibit different attitudes towards gains and losses. In their Nobel-prize winning work, Kahneman and Tversky proposed prospect theory [13] in order to capture these attitudes with appropriately defined utility and probability weighting functions. 1 Prospect theory has been one of the most widely accepted models of human decision-making, and has shown its relevance in a broad range of disciplines [14] - [16] , including recent applications in engineering [17] - [21] .
Motivated by the strong empirical and behavioral foundations of prospect theory, we study how to control the behavior of human decision-makers with prospect-theoretic utilities in a game-theoretic setting. We consider a broad class of games where users compete over a shared failure-prone system. We use the term "resource" to refer to this shared system to maintain consistency with related game-theoretic models. Specifically, in our setting, a set of players split their budget between a safe resource with a constant return and a shared "common pool" resource (CPR). As total investment or utilization by all players in the CPR increases, it becomes more likely for the CPR to fail, in which case the players do not receive any return from it. If the CPR does not fail, then the players receive a return per unit investment according to a rate of return function. Shared resources with increasing rates of return exhibit so-called network effects [22] ; examples include peer to peer file sharing systems. 2 CPRs with decreasing rates of return model congestion effects and describe engineered systems such as transportation and communication networks [25] , [26] and natural resources such as fisheries [27] . We consider CPRs with both network and congestion effects in this work. In Section III, we further discuss how this general model captures the externalities present in several applications.
A. Contributions
We study a tax mechanism where each player is charged a tax amount proportional to her investment in the CPR. A 1 The probability weighting function captures the transformation of true probabilities into perceived probabilities by humans. We do not consider the impact of probability weighting in this work. 2 However, there are instances where authorities have shut down large online platforms that encourage illegal activities [23] , [24] . This is captured by resource failure in our setting.
central authority chooses the tax rate to control the utilization of the shared resource. Analysis of this taxation scheme is quite challenging under prospect-theoretic preferences. Building upon the analysis in [28] (where we analyzed users' equilibrium strategies in the absence of taxation), we first show that the game admits a unique pure Nash equilibrium (PNE). We refer to the total investment in the CPR at a PNE as its utilization, and the failure probability as its fragility.
Our primary goal is to identify conditions under which: 1) there exists a tax rate that achieves a desired (e.g. socially optimal) level of CPR utilization, and 2) there exists an optimal tax rate that maximizes a continuous function of the tax rate and utilization (such as the revenue). In order to answer these questions, we provide conditions under which utilization is monotone and continuous in the tax rate. It is perhaps natural to expect that a higher tax rate will reduce the utilization in a continuous manner. However, for CPRs that exhibit network effects, we find that behavioral risk preferences can sometimes cause utilization (and fragility) to increase with a higher tax rate. Furthermore, we illustrate that utilization can be discontinuous as the tax rate increases, both as a consequence of the shape of the utility function, and under heterogeneous prospect-theoretic preferences. We (separately) identify (i) conditions on the CPR characteristics and prospect-theoretic parameters under which utilization decreases monotonically with tax rate, and (ii) the range of tax rates under which the utilization varies continuously. In contrast to CPRs that exhibit network effects, we show that for CPRs that exhibit congestion effects, utilization is continuous and monotonically decreasing in the tax rate under heterogeneous prospect-theoretic preferences of the players. Building upon these insights, we then identify the range of utilization that can be achieved via our taxation scheme.
Finally we explore the implications of imposing different (player-specific) tax rates on the players. We show that imposing different tax rates on a set of homogeneous loss averse players leads to a higher utilization than imposing a uniform tax rate (equal to the mean of the heterogeneous tax rates).
B. Related work
Within the game-theoretic framework, controlling the resource utilization levels through economic incentives such as taxes and rewards has been studied extensively [29] - [31] . In [29] , the authors study how a taxation scheme known as Pigovian tax improves social welfare at a PNE in a CPR game. The effect of player-specific tax sensitivities on the price of anarchy were studied in [30] , [32] in the context of nonatomic congestion games. In contrast, our game formulation is an instance of atomic splittable congestion games [33] . To the best of our knowledge, there has been no investigation of the impact of behavioral risk preferences on users' strategies under taxation in congestion or CPR games.
II. PROSPECT THEORY
As discussed in the previous section, our focus is on behavioral preferences captured by the utility function of prospect theory [13] . Specifically, consider a gamble that has an outcome with value z ∈ R. A prospect-theoretic individual perceives its utility in a skewed manner, via the function
where z 0 is the reference point, α ∈ (0, 1] is the sensitivity parameter and k ∈ (0, ∞] is referred to as the loss aversion index. Increase in utility with respect to the reference point (z ≥ z 0 ) is referred to as a gain and decrease in utility is referred to as a loss (z < z 0 ). The parameter α shapes the utility function according to observed behavior, i.e., the utility function is concave in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. Accordingly, the decision maker is said to be "risk averse" in gains and "risk seeking" in losses. As its name indicates, the parameter k captures loss aversion behavior. Specifically, when α = 1, a loss of $1 feels like a loss of $k to the player. A value of k > 1 implies that the individual is loss averse, while k < 1 implies that the individual is gain seeking. When the reference point is an exogenous constant, the values k = 1 and α = 1 capture risk neutral behavior. A smaller α implies greater deviation from risk neutral behavior. The shape of the value function is shown for different values of k in Figure 1 , with α = 0.5 and z 0 = 0.
III. FRAGILE COMMON POOL RESOURCE GAME
We start by introducing the Fragile Common Pool Resource game [28] . Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players. Each player has an endowment or wealth equal to 1 which she must split between a safe resource and a shared common pool resource (CPR). We define the strategy of a player i ∈ N as her investment in the CPR, denoted by x i ∈ [0, 1]. The total investment by all players in the CPR is denoted by x T = i∈N x i . Following conventional notation, we denote the profile of investments by all players other than i as
,j =i x j , be the total investment of all players other than i.
Players receive returns on their investments from both resources. The return per unit investment from the safe resource is normalized to 1, i.e., player i investing 1 − x i in the safe resource receives a return of 1 − x i . The return from the CPR is subject to risk, captured by a probability of failure p(x T ), which is a function of the aggregate investment in the CPR. If 
Fig. 2: Central authority sets a tax rate t to control human utilization of a failure-prone common pool resource (CPR).
the CPR fails, players do not receive any return from it. If the CPR does not fail, it has a per unit return that is a function of the total investment x T , denoted byr(x T ). In other words, player i gets x ir (x T ) from the CPR when it does not fail. The formulation described above has been studied in many different contexts.
1) The above formulation was studied as common pool resource games to model competition over failure-prone shared resources such as fisheries [27] , [34] . 2) CPR games, without resource failure, are equivalent to an instance of atomic splittable congestion games on a network with two nodes and two parallel links joining them. One link corresponds to the CPR described above and the second has a constant delay of 1. This class of games has been extensively studied in the context of transportation and communication networks [26] , [33] . 3) Fragile CPR games are related to the setting in [18] , where players are microgrid operators who decide the fraction of energy to store for potentially selling at a higher price in the event of an emergency. 3 Both settings are related if we define the investment of a player as the fraction of stored energy, and p(x T ) as the probability that the energy requirement during emergency is smaller than the total stored energy (i.e., energy price does not increase and the players incur losses). 4) In resource dilemma games [35] , players bid for utilizing a fraction of a shared resource with unknown size. If the total demand exceeds the size of the resource, no player receives any benefit. This model is potentially relevant when a set of users compete over a shared energy storage system [36] . This class of games is closely related to Fragile CPR games where x i is the bid of player i, and p(x T ) is the distribution of resource size. Given the breadth of applications where this formulation arises, the goal of this paper is to understand to what extent we can control the utilization (x T ) of the resource at the Nash equilibrium by imposing taxes on players' investments.
IV. PROSPECT-THEORETIC UTILITY UNDER TAXATION
We first consider the case where a central authority imposes a uniform tax rate t ≥ 0 per unit investment in the CPR on the players. Figure 2 represents the schematic of our setting.
Under this taxation scheme, a player i with investment x i in the CPR is charged tx i as tax. We will consider the implications of player-specific tax rates in Section IX. Each player is prospect-theoretic, with a player-specific loss aversion index k i ∈ R >0 and sensitivity parameter α i ∈ (0, 1]. We define the reference utility of a player i as her utility when she invests entirely in the safe resource, i.e., chooses x i = 0. Accordingly, the reference utility is 1 for every player. Now consider a strategy profile {x j } j∈N with total investment x T . In the event of CPR failure, each player i with a nonzero x i experiences a loss −(1 + t)x i , which comprises of the lost income from not investing x i in the safe resource, and the tax payment. If the CPR succeeds, the reference-dependent return is x i (r(x T )−1−t), which could be positive (representing a gain) or negative (representing a loss) depending on the values of t and x T . For ease of exposition, we define r(x T ) :=r(x T ) − 1, and henceforth refer to r(x T ) as the rate of return function.
Using the prospect-theoretic utility function (1), player i's perception of gains and losses is
Player i maximizes the expected utility with respect to the above utility function given by
where
We refer to f i (x T , t) as the effective rate of return of player i. Figure 3 shows the shapes of f i (x T , t) for different parameters. We denote this class of Fragile CPR games as Γ(N , {u i } i∈N ). In this paper, we consider Fragile CPR games that satisfy the following assumptions. Assumption 1: The class of Fragile CPR games Γ(N , {u i } i∈N ) has the following properties.
1) The failure probability p(x T ) is convex, strictly increasing and continuously differentiable for x T ∈ [0, 1) and
2) The rate of return r(x T ) is concave, positive, strictly monotonic and continuously differentiable. 3) Definē
We assume thatt > 0, and the tax rate t ∈ [0,t). These assumptions capture a fairly broad class of resources, while retaining analytical tractability.
To explain the third point in Assumption 1, note from the definition oft that for any tax rate t ≥t, the effective rate of return is nonpositive for every player and every x T ∈ [0, 1]. Accordingly, all players have expected utility equal to 0 at any PNE. On the other hand, for t <t, there exist player(s) who make a nonzero investment at the PNE. Furthermore, at a PNE with nonzero CPR investments, the total investment must be such that r(
. Accordingly, most of our analysis will focus on the range of total investments that lie within a subset
is strictly decreasing, we have S t := [0, b t ], where
where r −1 (t) = {y ∈ [0, 1]|r(y) = t}. On the other hand, when r(x T ) is strictly increasing, we have S t := [a t , 1], where
Note that for t ∈ [0,t], S t is well defined and is nonempty.
Remark 1:
The taxation scheme introduced here can be viewed as a subsidy on the safe resource (which increases the rate of return of the safe resource to 1 + t). The referencedependent utility under this subsidy is identical to (2) . Such a subsidy scheme was studied in [29] .
In the following section, we investigate the existence and uniqueness of PNE in Fragile CPR games under taxes.
V. CHARACTERISTICS OF PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Consider a Fragile CPR game with a fixed tax rate t ∈ [0,t). We define the best response correspondence of a player i as
, we will show that B i (·) is single-valued and continuous in x −i . We start with the following lemma. While the proof largely follows from identical arguments as the proof of Lemma 1 in [28] (where we considered Fragile CPR games without taxation), we present it here as the proof formally defines several important quantities that are useful in the analysis throughout the paper. Recall thatx −i denotes the total investment by all players other than i.
Lemma 1: Consider a Fragile CPR game with a fixed tax rate t ∈ [0,t). Then, for any player i, the following are true. 
is positive, and (ii) satisfies
Proof: We consider the following two cases.
On the other hand, if f i (0, t) > 0, we define y t i ∈ S t as the unique investment where f i (y t i , t) = 0. Ifx −i ≥ y t i , any nonzero investment ǫ by player i will lead to f i (ǫ +x −i , t) < 0, and consequently a strictly negative utility. Therefore, B i (x −i ) = {0} in this case. On the other hand, ifx −i < y t i , there exists δ > 0 such that δ +x −i < y t i , and therefore,
Thus, there exists a unique investment y 
Then it must necessarily satisfy the first order condition of optimality ∂E(ui) ∂xi = 0 for the utility in (3), leading to
Since Figure 3 illustrates the quantities introduced in the above lemma; the subscript i is dropped for convenience. We now build upon the above discussion, and introduce a few other important quantities. For a player i, we define
It follows from the first order optimality condition in (8) that a nonzero best response
is a natural extension of the function g(x T ) defined in [28] . Accordingly, at a fixed tax rate t, we have the following result on the monotonicity of the function g i (x T , t) with respect to x T .
Lemma 2: For x T ∈ I t i , we have ∂gi(xT ,t) ∂xT < 0 . The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 4 in [28] , and thus we omit it. However, g i (x T , t) is not always decreasing in t as we will explore later. As a consequence of the above two lemmas, we have the following result.
Proposition 1: Consider a Fragile CPR game with a fixed tax rate rate t satisfying Assumption 1. Then there exists a unique PNE of the game.
Proof: In Lemma 1, we showed that when a player i has a nonzero best response, the total investment in the CPR lies in the interval I t i . When x T ∈ S t , the rate of return function is monotone, concave and positive. Therefore, the results on the uniqueness and continuity of best responses from Lemma 2 and 3 in [28] carry over to the present setting under taxation. As a consequence of Brouwer's fixed point theorem [37] , a PNE exists. The uniqueness of PNE follows the monotonicity of nonzero best responses shown in Lemma 2; its proof follows identical arguments as the proof of Theorem 1 in [28] .
At a given tax rate t, we denote the total investment in the CPR at corresponding PNE as x t NE , and refer to it as the utilization (of the CPR). Furthermore, we refer to the corresponding failure probability p(x t NE ) as its fragility. We now define the support of a PNE.
Definition 1: The support of the PNE of the game Γ, denoted Supp(Γ), is the set of players who have a nonzero investment in the CPR. In particular, by Lemma 1, Supp(Γ) := {i ∈ N |x t NE < y t i }. Accordingly, the total investment at the PNE satisfies
From our earlier discussion, we have x T ∈ I t i for i ∈ Supp(Γ). Therefore, for increasing rate of return functions, We conclude this section with two lemmas that will be useful in several proofs later in the paper, and a brief discussion on the social welfare. The first shows the monotonicity of z t i in t for certain risk preferences.
Lemma 3: Consider a CPR game with increasing r(x T ), and a player i with α i = 1, and let t 2 < t 1 <t. If k i < 1, then z t2 i ≤ z t1 i , and vice versa. Proof: When x T ∈ S t , the effective rate of return function in (4) for player i is given by
Let z t2 i > a t1 > 0; otherwise the result follows directly. According to the first order optimality condition for z
i . The same reasoning applies to the converse.
Observe that in Figure 3b , z t i is indeed increasing in t in accordance with the above lemma. Now, let Γ 1 and Γ 2 be two instances of Fragile CPR games with identical resource characteristics and tax rates t 1 and t 2 , respectively. Let the respective total PNE investments be x t1 NE and x t2 NE . We prove the following result which holds for CPRs with both increasing and decreasing r(x T ).
Lemma 4:
and the first statement trivially holds. When y t1 i > 0, it follows from Lemma 1 that f i (y t1 i , t 1 ) = 0. When t 2 < t 1 , it is easy to see (from (6) and (7)) that S t1 ⊆ S t2 . Furthermore, note from (4) that f i is decreasing in the second argument t for both increasing and decreasing rate of return functions. Accordingly, f i (y For the second part of proof, let j ∈ Supp(Γ 1 ). From Definition 1, we have
As a result, j ∈ Supp(Γ 2 ). This concludes the proof.
As discussed in the introduction, one of the key motivations behind this work is to understand conditions under which a socially desirable level of utilization can be achieved via taxation. In the context of congestion games and CPR games, the metric that is often used to capture a socially desired level of utilization is the resource utilization that maximizes the sum of utilities of all players in the absence of taxation (also referred to as the social welfare) [30] , [31] , [38] . The following result shows that the CPR utilization and fragility are higher at the PNE compared to their counterparts at a social welfare maximizing strategy profile.
Proposition 2:
N be a set of investments that maximizes Ψ(x) := i∈N Eu i (x i , x −i ) at t = 0. Then, the resulting total CPR investment at the social optimum is at most the total CPR investment at the PNE, i.e., x 0 OPT ≤ x 0 NE . The result holds under heterogeneous prospect-theoretic preferences of the users. We refer to Appendix A for the proof. In order to answer questions such as the existence of a tax rate that achieves x 0 OPT , we now investigate whether utilization, as a function of the tax rate, is well behaved, i.e., whether it is monotonically decreasing and continuous.
VI. MONOTONICITY OF UTILIZATION UNDER TAXATION
We now investigate whether the total investment x t NE at the PNE (i.e., the utilization of the CPR) is monotone in t. Note from (3) that the utility of a player in a game with a tax rate t is equivalent to that in a game without taxes, but with a smaller rate of return function (r(x T ) − t), and a larger index of loss aversion (k i (1+t) αi ). Therefore, intuition suggests that an increase in tax rate would lead to smaller utilization. We start this section by showing that this is not always the case for CPRs with increasing r(x T ) and under prospect theory.
A. Monotonicity of utilization under network effects (or lack thereof)
Recall that online platforms such as peer to peer file sharing systems are instances of CPRs that exhibit network effects. In the following example, we show that imposing a higher tax rate can lead to higher utilization and fragility.
Example 1: Consider a Fragile CPR game with n = 3 players. Let r(x T ) = 8x T + 5 and p(x T ) = x T . Let α = 0.15 and k = 1.2 for all players, i.e., all players are loss averse, and the deviation from risk neutral behavior (α = 1 and k = 1) is significant. As shown in Figure 4 , when t increases from 0 to 4.9, the fragility is not monotonically decreasing.
Recall from Figure 1 that α < 1 gives rise to risk seeking behavior in losses and risk averse behavior in gains. When the value of α approaches 0, the modified loss aversion index k(1 + t) α does not increase by much at a higher tax rate. This encourages players to increase their investment into the CPR. Such behavior is not limited to the case when α is very small. In the conference version of this paper [1] , we provided additional examples where a higher tax rate leads to higher utilization when the index of loss aversion is smaller than 1. In both instances, players increase their investments to receive a higher return and compensate for the tax payment (at the cost of increased risk of resource failure).
We now obtain a sufficient condition under which a higher tax rate does indeed lead to smaller utilization; a central authority can check this condition, and avoid the counter productive outcome observed in the previous subsection.
Recall
The following lemma proves a few useful properties of this function.
Lemma 5:
The function q i (·, ·) defined above has the following properties.
The proof is presented in Appendix B. We are now ready to prove the main result of this subsection.
Proposition
According to Lemma 4, we have Supp(Γ 1 ) ⊆ Supp(Γ 2 ). From the characterization of PNE in equation (10), we obtain
In the remainder of the proof, our goal is to contradict the inequality in equation (13) . In particular, for each player j ∈ Supp(Γ 1 ), we show that g j (x t1 NE , t 1 ) < g j (x t2 NE , t 2 ). Consider a player j ∈ Supp(Γ 1 ). From Lemma 1, x t1 NE < y t1 j . Furthermore, from Lemma 4, we have y t1 j ≤ y t2 j . Together with our assumption, we obtain
NE , t 1 ). Furthermore, from its definition, q j (x, t) is strictly increasing in t. Thus, for t ∈ [t 2 , t 1 ],
. Combining these observations, we obtain
(following the first part of Lemma 5). Therefore,
NE , t 2 ), which contradicts (13).
The above result establishes a condition that we can check to ensure that a higher tax rate will lead to smaller utilization. All else being equal, if players become more loss averse (i.e., as k i increases), it becomes more likely that the condition k i > q i (x T , t) is satisfied. Furthermore, when all players have identical α, we only need to check the condition for the player with the smallest loss aversion index. 4 When α = 1, q(x T , t) is independent of t from (12) . We now obtain the following result.
Proposition 4: Consider a Fragile CPR game with increasing r(x T ). Let α = 1 and k ≥ 1 for every player. Let t 2 < t 1 <t.
Proof: Assume on the contrary that x t1 NE > x t2 NE . Following analogous arguments as the first part of the proof of Proposition 3, it suffices to show that for a player j ∈ Supp(Γ 1 ),
It is easy to see that
The result now follows from identical arguments as the proof of Proposition 3.
The above result states that when users have α j = 1, and are risk neutral or loss averse (i.e., have k j ≥ 1), a higher tax rate leads to smaller CPR utilization. Therefore, the lack of monotonicity observed in the earlier examples is a consequence of prospect-theoretic risk preferences.
B. Monotonicity of utilization under congestion effects
In contrast with the observations in the above subsection, for resources with a decreasing r(x T ), we show here that an increase of tax rate always leads to smaller utilization of the CPR. The result holds when k i ∈ R >0 and α i ∈ (0, 1] are player-specific, and potentially heterogeneous.
We start with the following useful lemma, which holds for the general form of the utility function (4) with α i ∈ (0, 1].
Lemma 6: Let x T ∈ [0, 1]. For a player j, let T xT j := {t ∈ [0,t)|f j (x T , t) > 0}. Let g j (x T , t) be the function defined in (9) . Then, ∂gj (xT ,t) ∂t < 0 for t ∈ T xT j . In other words, at a given utilization level x T , the function g j (x T , t) is strictly decreasing in the tax rate t over the range of tax rates at which the effective rate of return remains positive. The proof is presented in Appendix B. We are now ready the state the main result of this subsection.
Proposition 5: Consider a Fragile CPR game with decreasing r(x T ). Let 0 ≤ t 2 < t 1 <t. 
We obtain a contradiction to the above equation as follows. Consider a player j ∈ Supp(Γ 1 ). Then x t1 NE ∈ I t1 j , where I t1 j is the interval defined in Lemma 1; in particular, when x ∈ I t1 j , we have f j (x, t 1 ) > 0 and f j,x (x, t 1 ) < 0. When r(x) is decreasing in x, and x t1 NE > x t2 NE , then x t2 NE ∈ I t1 j . Therefore, from Lemma 2, we have
NE , t 2 ), which contradicts (14) .
Recall that we want to characterize the set of total investments that can be achieved at a PNE via taxation. In order to answer this question, we now investigate whether utilization varies as a continuous function of the tax rate.
VII. CONTINUITY OF UTILIZATION UNDER TAXATION

A. Continuity of utilization under network effects (or lack thereof)
We start with a few numerical examples to illustrate how utilization can be discontinuous in the tax rate. We discuss the mathematical intuition behind such discontinuities, followed by identifying conditions (on the prospect-theoretic preferences) under which utilization remains continuous.
First consider a player i who is risk neutral (i.e., α i = 1 and k i = 1). For such a player i, the effective rate of return (4) is given by
Therefore, for such a player, z
is independent of t. Now suppose z T and r(x T ) = 3x T + 1. Note thatt = 1.655, i.e., max xT ∈[0,1] f (x T ,t) = 0. In Figure 5a , we show how utilization x t NE decreases as t increases (in accordance with Proposition 4); there is a discontinuity att where x t NE drops from 0.5665 to 0. The socially optimal level of utilization in the absence of taxes is x 0 OPT = 0.6829. For t ∈ [0,t), x t NE is monotone, continuous and as t ↑t (i.e., t approachest from below), x t NE → zt i = 0.5665. Therefore, there exists a tax rate t * such that x
OPT . In the following example, we show that when players exhibit gain seeking behavior (i.e., k < 1), there are instances where the socially optimal utilization cannot be achieved.
Example 3: Consider a Fragile CPR game with p(x T ) = 0.2 + 0.8x 4 T , and r(x T ) = 3x T + 1 as before. We consider homogeneous players with α = 1, k = 0.05. Recall that the shape of f (x T , t) for these parameters were shown in Figure  3b for different values of tax rates. Note from Figure 3b that As shown in Figure 5b for n = 2, x t NE increases continuously as t increases unitlt, and then drops to 0. On the other hand, when n = 8, x t NE is decreasing in t, and once again, has a discontinuous jump att. As discussed earlier, x t NE > z t at every tax rate. The socially optimal total investment in the absence of taxes x 0 OPT = 0.7351 is not achieved at any tax rate as shown in the figure.
In the above two examples with homogeneous players, x t NE remained continuous for t ∈ [0,t). We now show that heterogeneity in prospect-theoretic preferences can induce discontinuity at tax rates smaller thant.
Example 4: Consider a Fragile CPR game with p(x T ) = 0.2 + 0.8x 4 T and r(x T ) = 3x T + 1, as before. Let there be two players, with prospect-theoretic parameters α 1 = 1, k 1 = 1.1 and α 2 = 0.3, k 2 = 1.5. In this case,t = 2.19. Figure  3c showed the respective effective rates of return under these parameters at t = 1.583. Note from Figure 3c that max xT ∈St f 1 (x T , 1.583) = 0, i.e., for tax rates larger than 1.583, player 1 will invest 0 at the equilibrium. Accordingly, for t < 1.583, x t NE is larger than z t 1 . Figure 5c shows that for t < 1.583, player 1 has a larger investment than player 2. As t becomes slightly larger than 1.583, the investment by player 1 drops to 0, while player 2 increases her investment. However, the total investment has a discontinuous jump from 0.5612 to 0.4667. As t increases from 1.583 to 2.19, the investment by player 2 increases continuously, and at t = 2.19, her investment drops to 0.
Motivated by the above observations, we now identify conditions under which x t NE is continuous in t. With a minor abuse of notation, we denote x t NE as a function of t, i.e., we define x NE : [0,t) → [0, 1] such that x NE (t) := x t NE . Now consider a player i in a Fragile CPR game with increasing r(x T ). Definet i := sup{t ≥ 0| max xT ∈St f i (x T , t) > 0}, i.e.,t i is the highest tax rate such that player i makes a nonzero investment in the CPR when investing in isolation. We are now ready to state the main continuity result.
Proposition 6: The function
The proof is presented in Appendix C. We largely rely on Berge's maximum theorem [37] , also stated formally in Appendix C.
The result states that utilization remains continuous over a subset of tax rates for which utilization is nonzero. Recall that in Example 4,t 1 = 1.583, whilet 2 = 2.19. As shown in Figure 5c , utilization is continuous for t ∈ [0, 1.583) in accordance with the above result, and has a discontinuous jump at t = 1.583. Several important consequences of this result will be discussed in the next section.
B. Continuity of utilization under congestion effects
We now show that for CPRs with decreasing rate of return functions, the total investment at the PNE is continuous in t for t ∈ [0,t], i.e., the entire range of tax rates with nonzero utilization. Our analysis relies on Berge's maximum theorem. In order to apply Berge's maximum theorem, we need to express the total PNE investment x t NE as the unique maximizer of a function that is jointly continuous in the total investment and the tax rate.
First we define the following function. For a player i, x T ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ [0,t), let
Note thatĝ i (x T , t) is bounded 5 , and therefore well-defined. In the following lemma, we prove the (joint) continuity ofĝ i (·, ·). (15) is jointly continuous in x T and t.
Proof: First observe that at a given t,ĝ i (x T , t) is continuous and monotone in x T for x T ∈ [0, 1]; since f i (y t i , t) = 0, we haveĝ i (y t i , t) = 0, and the monotonicity follows from Lemma 2. Following [39] , it now suffices to show that g i (x T , t) is continuous in t at a given x T .
Since f i (x T , t) is strictly decreasing in t, the condition
is continuous in t as both numerator and denominator are continuous in t.
5 For x T ∈ [0, 1], and nonempty T
. Furthermore, f i,x (x T , 0) (with expression (20) in Appendix B) is strictly smaller than 0 under Assumption 1.
For
We now show that the total PNE investment can be stated as a maximizer of a function that is continuous in both the total investment and the tax rate.
Lemma 8: Define
Then, at a given t, argmax xT ∈[0,1] h C (x T , t) is single-valued, and is equal to x t NE . The proof follows from identical arguments as the proof of Lemma 11 in Appendix C, and is omitted.
As before, let
We are now ready to prove the following result.
Proposition 7:
The function
Proof: Consider a set-valued map or correspondence
From its definition, C is compact-valued, and is both upper and lower hemicontinuous at every t ∈ [0,t). From Lemma 7, h C (x T , t) is jointly continuous in x T and t. Following Berge's maximum theorem (see Appendix C), the set-valued map argmax xT ∈C(t) h C (x T , t) is upper hemicontinuous. From Lemma 8, we have argmax xT ∈C(t) h C (x T , t) = {x NE (t)}, i.e., the set-valued map is in fact single-valued. Therefore, x NE (t) is continuous in t for t ∈ [0,t).
We now show that x NE (t) is continuous at t =t. From the strict monotonicity and continuity of f (·, ·) and the definition oft, we have max i∈N f i (0,t) = 0. Therefore, x NE (t) = 0. Now, recall from Lemma 1 and Definition 1 that x NE (t) < max i∈N y t i at any tax rate t. Furthermore, as t ↑t, we have max
This concludes the proof.
Our results on the monotonicity and continuity of utilization have several implications which we discuss below.
VIII. MAIN RESULTS
Recall from the introduction that our goal is to characterize the range of utilizations (including the socially optimal level of utilization x 0 OPT ) that can be achieved at the PNE by a suitable choice of tax rate. We answer this question in this section.
A. CPRs with network effects
Our analysis on the monotonicity and continuity of utilization leads to the following theorem. Recall thatt i := sup{t ≥ 0| max xT ∈St f i (x T , t) > 0}.
Theorem 1: Consider a Fragile CPR game with increasing r(x T ), and player-specific prospect-theoretic preferences.
• For all continuous functions w(x NE (t), t) and δ > 0, there exists a t * ∈ [0, min i∈Nti − δ] that maximizes w(x NE (t), t).
• Let j := argmin i∈Nti , and letx j := lim t↑tj z
NE ,x j )) there exists a tax rate t such that x * = x t NE .
• Ifx j < x 0 OPT , then there exists a tax rate t * such that x t * NE = x 0 OPT . Proof: The first statement follows from Proposition 6 and the extreme value theorem. For the second part, note from the definition oft i that it is the smallest tax rate at which the maximum value of f i (x T ,t i ) = 0, x T ∈ St i . From the definitions of z as shown in Figure 5b .
We now describe several important implications of the above result for special cases of prospect-theoretic preferences.
When all players have identical α, the player with the largest loss aversion index has the smallestt i . When all players have identical α and k,t i is identical for every player, and thust = min i∈Nti . Thus, the conclusions of the above result holds over the entire range of tax rates under which PNE utilization is nonzero. Finally, let all players have homogeneous preferences with α = 1 and k ≥ 1. Recall that in this case, their utilities are linear or piecewise concave, and reflects risk neutral or risk averse preferences. We have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Let all players have α = 1 and k ≥ 1. Then there exists a tax rate t * such that x t * NE = x 0 OPT . Proof: From Lemma 3, we know that as the tax rate increases, z t decreases for every player. Furthermore, from Proposition 4 in our prior work [28] , x 0 OPT is equal to the investment by a single player when she invests in isolation. Therefore,x = lim t↑t z t < z 0 < x 0 OPT . The result now follows from Theorem 1.
B. CPRs with congestion effects
The counterpart of the above result is much stronger for CPRs with congestion effects, and is stated below.
Theorem 2: Consider a Fragile CPR game with decreasing r(x T ), and player-specific prospect-theoretic preferences.
• For all continuous functions w(x NE (t), t), there exists a tax rate t * ∈ [0,t] that maximizes w(x NE (t), t).
• For any given level of utilization x * ∈ [0, x Our discussion thus far assumes that the central authority imposes an identical tax rate t on every player. In the following section, we compare the utilization when the central authority imposes different tax rates on different players with the utilization under a uniform tax rate for all players.
IX. UNIFORM VERSUS DIFFERENTIATED TAX RATES
In order to isolate the effect of differentiated tax rates, we assume that all players have identical loss aversion indices k > 1 and α = 1. Specifically, we show that the total investment at the PNE is smaller when all players are charged an identical tax rate, compared to the PNE of a game where tax rates are heterogeneous.
Without loss of generality, let the tax rate imposed on player i be γ i t where γ i ∈ [0, 1] is referred to as her tax sensitivity.
Following equation (4), the expected utility of player i at a strategy profile with x T ∈ S i,t is given by
Remark 4: Our results on PNE existence and uniqueness rely on the uniqueness, continuity and monotonicity properties of the best response. These properties remain unchanged with a linear scaling of the tax rate, and accordingly a PNE exists and is unique when the utilities are defined as in (16) .
Remark 5: Note that γ i can be viewed as the sensitivity of player i to the tax rate t. Impacts of tax sensitivities on price of anarchy in congestion games was studied recently in [30] , outside of the context of behavioral risk attitudes. Playerspecific tax sensitivities can arise when players have different reference utilities. In particular, the utility in (16) arises if the reference utility of player i is −(1−γ i )tx i . In this case, player i perceives her tax payment as part of her reference utility as opposed to considering it entirely as a loss. If γ i = 0, the results are the same as the case without taxation. If γ i = 1, then we have the identical setting as the previous sections.
We now consider the family Γ m of fragile CPR games with n players each with α = 1 and k > 1, r(x T ) and p(x T ) satisfying Assumption 1, and the mean of the tax sensitivities is γ m ∈ [0, 1]. With a slight abuse of notation, we sometimes refer a player with sensitivity γ m as player m. Let t m := sup{t ≥ 0| max xT ∈Sm,t f m (x T , t) > 0}. The following result holds for both increasing and decreasing rate of return functions. The main ideas behind the proof is analogous to the ideas used in the proof of Theorem 5 in [28] .
Proposition 8: Let t ∈ [0,t m ). Let Γ M ∈ Γ m be the game where the sensitivity parameter is γ m for every player. Then, among all games in Γ m , CPR utilization is smallest in Γ M .
Proof: Let Γ H ∈ Γ m be a Fragile CPR game where the sensitivity parameters (γ i , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}) are playerspecific. Without loss of generality, let 0 ≤ γ 1 ≤ γ 2 ≤ . . . ≤ γ n ≤ 1, with n i=1 γ i = nγ m . Furthermore, let the utilizations at the respective PNEs of Γ H and Γ M be x H and x M . Suppose x H = 0. Then, we havef (x T )− γ 1 tv(x T ) ≤ 0 for x T ∈ S 1,t . Since γ m ≥ γ 1 , we also havef (x T )−γ m tv(x T ) ≤ 0 for x T ∈ S m,t , which implies x M = 0. Since t <t m , the case x H = 0 does not arise.
Therefore, x H > 0. For j / ∈ Supp(Γ H ), we havê
for every γ ≥ γ j . Therefore, Supp(Γ H ) consists of a set of players with smallest sensitivity parameters. Since x H > 0, player 1 ∈ Supp(Γ H ). From equation (10) for Γ H , we have
where h xH ,t (·) is a function of the tax sensitivity γ at a given total investment x H and tax rate t. Note that, since the players are loss averse, we have v
As a result, for γ ≥ γ 1 , the numerator of h xH ,t (γ) is strictly decreasing in γ, while the denominator is strictly increasing in γ. We now define an interval J ⊆ [γ 1 , 1] as follows.
If
, whereγ ≤ 1 is the unique tax sensitivity at which h xH ,t (γ) = 0, and every player i ∈ Supp(Γ H ) satisfies γ i ∈ J . For γ ∈ J , we havef (
For γ ∈ J , straightforward calculations yield
Following (17), we have h ′′ xH ,t (γ) > 0 for γ ∈ J . Therefore, max(h xH ,t (γ), 0) is continuous and convex for γ ∈ [γ 1 , 1]. Applying Jensen's inequality, we obtain
We now consider two cases. First, suppose h xH ,t (γ m ) ≤ 0.
For an increasing and concave r(x T ),
The above result shows that when players are risk averse with α = 1, charging different tax rates to different players leads to higher utilization and fragility of the CPR. Since players with identical loss aversion indices make identical investments in the CPR, our result suggests that a central authority should impose similar tax rates on players who make similar investments at the equilibria without taxation.
The analysis is significantly more involved when α < 1. On the other hand, since the utilities are continuous in α, we should expect the above result to hold when α is close to 1. We conclude with the following remark.
Remark 6: In addition to utilization, another important quantity of interest to the central authority is the revenue, defined as n i=1 γ i x i,NE . Straightforward calculations show that the function γh xH ,t (γ) defined in the above proof is concave in γ. Therefore, if the support of both games Γ H and Γ M contain all n players, then it can be shown that the revenue is higher in Γ M , even though utilization is lower.
X. CONCLUSION
We investigated the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in controlling the utilization of a failure-prone shared resource under prospect-theoretic risk preferences of users. We first showed the existence and uniqueness of PNE in Fragile CPR games under taxation. We then showed that for resources that exhibit network effects, heterogeneous prospect-theoretic utilities of the players can lead to increase in utilization and fragility with higher tax rates, and the utilization at the Nash equilibrium can be discontinuous in the tax rate. In contrast, for resources with a decreasing rate of return or congestion effects, utilization is always decreasing and continuous in the tax rate. Building upon these insights, we identified the range of utilization that can be achieved by a suitable choice of tax rate for both classes of resources. Finally, we showed that for loss averse players, imposing differentiated tax rates results in higher utilization compared to the case where all players are charged an identical tax rate.
Our results highlight the nuances of controlling human behavior under uncertainty, and provide compelling insights on how to identify and control their utilization of shared systems via economic incentives. Future work will focus on characterizing revenue maximizing taxation schemes, and designing mechanisms for human users in dynamic environments. since f i (x OPT ) < 0 and f j (x OPT ) > 0. This contradicts the optimality of x OPT .
Since x OPT > x NE and f i (x OPT ) > 0, x OPT ∈ I i , where I i is the interval defined in Lemma 1. From the first order optimality condition for player i at the PNE (8), we obtain
where f i,x (x T ) = ∂fi ∂xT (x T ), and the second inequality in the second line follows from Lemma 2.
We now show that for every player j other than i, x αj j,OPT f j,x (x OPT ) ≤ 0. For decreasing rate of return functions, this is true since f (·) is strictly decreasing in the total investment. On the other hand, for increasing rate of return functions, we have the following two cases.
Case 1: max xT ∈[0,1] f j (x T ) > 0. Following the discussion in Lemma 1, we have x NE > z j in this case. Therefore, f j,x (x NE ) < 0. Furthermore, f (·) is concave (following Lemma 1), and x OPT > x NE , which implies f j,x (x OPT ) < 0.
Case 2: max xT ∈[0,1] f j (x T ) ≤ 0. Following identical arguments as the second paragraph of the proof, we have x j,OPT = 0 in this case.
We are now ready to complete the proof. From the first order optimality condition for the social optimum, we obtain 
APPENDIX C PROOFS PERTAINING TO CONTINUITY OF UTILIZATION
A. Preliminaries
As stated earlier, our proofs largely rely on Berge's maximum theorem which we state below.
Theorem 3 (from [37] ): Let Θ and X be two metric spaces, and let C : Θ ⇒ X be a compact-valued correspondence. Let the function Φ : X × Θ → R be jointly continuous in both X and Θ. Define Φ(x, θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ.
If C is continuous at θ ∈ Θ, then 1) σ : Θ ⇒ X is compact-valued, upper hemicontinuous and closed at θ. 2) Φ * : Θ → R is continuous at θ.
In many instances, the correspondence C takes the form of a parametrized constraint set, i.e., C(θ) = {x ∈ X|l j (x, θ) ≤ 0, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}}. For this class of constraints, we have the following sufficient conditions for the upper and lower hemicontinuity of C [40, Theorem 10, 12] .
Theorem 4: Let C : Θ ⇒ X ⊆ R k be given by C(θ) = {x ∈ X|l j (x, θ) ≤ 0, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}}.
1) Let X be closed, and all l j 's be continuous on X. Then, C is upper hemicontinunous on Θ. 2) Let l j 's be continuous and convex in x for each θ. If there exists (x, θ) such that l j (x, θ) < 0 for all j, then C is lower hemicontinuous at θ, and in some neighborhood of θ. Remark 7: Some authors use the term semi-continuity or open/closed correspondences instead of hemicontinuity [40] . The definitions coincide for closed and compact-valued correspondences, which is the case in this paper.
B. Proofs pertaining to continuity under network effects
We first introduce certain notation, and prove some preliminary lemmas. In appropriate places in this section, we treat y hemicontinuous at every t ∈ [0, min i∈Nti ). From Lemma 10, h N (x, t) is jointly continuous in x and t. Following Berge's maximum theorem, argmax x∈C(t) h N (x, t) is upper hemicontinuous. From Lemma 11, h N (x, t) is single-valued. Therefore, x NE (t) is continuous in t for t ∈ [0, min i∈Nti ).
